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THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: IS IT LEGISLATION?
The complexity of the law-making process and the need for
legislative efficiency have compelled legislatures to delegate authority
to administrative agencies and departments.1 The delegation of the
legislative power has raised important constitutional issues.2 The United
States Constitution divides the federal government into three branches.'
Each branch has specific powers and responsibilities.' The doctrine of
separation of powers demands that each branch carry out only those
functions designated by the Constitution.' The delegation of the
legislative authority to executive administrative agencies, therefore,
may constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.6 For the
most part, however, the Supreme Court has sanctioned such delegation.'
' See Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L.
REV. 513, 518-19 (1964). Stone has expressed the belief that the growth of administrative law
is a response to legislative shortfalls. Id. Stone classified the shortfalls into time limitations,
lack of specialized knowledge necessary for legislating in new areas, and limitations on
organizational aptness for supervision of legal development in areas of the law which de-
pend upon experience for expertise. Id. at 519. See also Melville, Legislative Control Over
Administrative Rule Making, 32 U. CINN. L. REV. 33, 33 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Melville].
2 See text accompanying notes 3-24 infra.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III. In the first three articles, the Constitution creates the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. Id.
Id. In the articles creating the three branches of government, the Constitution
enumerates the duties and powers of the respective branches. Id.
' See Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to
a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285, 288 n.13 [hereinafter cited as Probable
Reponse]. The separation of powers doctrine does not arise from an express constitutional
mandate, but is implied from the system of checks and balances the Constitution provides.
Id.
See note 7 infra; Melville, supra note 1, at 33-34.
See FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., con-
curring opinion) (Congress validly delegated power to levy assessments to administrative
agency under the Natural Gas Act). In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), the Supreme
Court made clear that it considered any attempt to delegate the legislative power a viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine. See id at 697 (Lamar, J., concurring opinion).
Later, the court softened its position, holding that Congress could delegate the legislative
power so long as Congress laid down standards to guide the agencies in the execution of the
power. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-98 (1940) (valid delegation
of power to fix minimum and maximum coal prices under Bituminous Coal Act). Today, the
Supreme Court accepts the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative power, even in
the absence of constraining standards. 415 U.S. at 352-53.
State courts have not granted broad discretion in allowing legislatures to delegate the
legislative power. In Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203
(Ky. 1961), the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized the need for safeguards when it
upheld the legislature's delegation of the power to private institutions to authorize public
aid for the education of "exceptional children." Id. at 207-08. In City of Chicago v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 41 Ill.2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a statute was
unconstitutional which conferred to the governing highway authority the power to permit
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The delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies
also raises the question whether Congress may exercise control over ex-
ecutive agencies' rule-making authority.' Rather than controlling an
agency's rule-making authority through the traditional channel of the
formal bill-passing procedure,9 Congress often has utilized the legislative
veto as a method of accomplishing control.10 A legislative veto is a
statutory mechanism which allows a legislature to disapprove proposed
agency rules and regulations by legislative resolution." The legislative
veto is non-traditional because the veto does not employ formal bill-
passing procedures. 2 Instead, the legislative veto utilizes a legislature
exceptions to a general prohibition against certain roadside advertising because the statute
delegated "unfettered" legislative power. Id. at -, 242 N.E.2d at 157.
See text accompanying notes 9-31 infra.
'See 1 MEZINES, STEIN & GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.02 at 61-63 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as MEZINES]. Congress has traditionally controlled agency rule-making
authority by formal legislation that denies appropriations, sets up oversight or watchdog
committees, or abolishes an agency altogether. Id.
The fundamental legislative power allows legislatures to control and supervise ad-
ministrative action. Neely, Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule Making in
West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 513, 548 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Neely]. Neely proposed
that since the legislature delegates the legislative power to the agencies initially, the
legislature should be able to revoke or amend the power by repeal or amendment of
statutory law. Id.; see Kinnane, Administrative Law: Some Observations on Separation of
Powers, 38 A.B.A.J. 19, 22 (1952).
"0 See MEZINES, supra note 9, at 63. The legislative veto has been defined as a
statutory mechanism which subjects the implementation of executive proposals, advanced
in pursuance of statute, to a further form of legislative consideration and control. Cooper &
Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467, 467 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Cooper]. In effect, the legislative veto imposes a condition of legislative
approval upon the operation of executive proposals or administrative rules. See id. at
475-76.
Congress has used the legislative veto to approve executive action (Act of June 30,
1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 414 (1933)), terminate a statute or a portion thereof (Defense
Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, § 716(c), 64 Stat. 822 (1950)), and disapprove executive action
(Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013(D)
(1970)). See Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983,1089-92 (1975) (Appendix A) [hereinafter cited as Watson]. Since the in-
ception of the modern legislative veto in 1932, over 125 federal statutes have provided for
direct legislative review of executive activity. Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative
Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEG. 593, 594 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Stewart]. Furthermore, 85% of
the legislative review provisions enacted between 1973 and 1975 included legislative vetoes.
Id. at 595. For a history of the legislative veto, see Ginanne, The Control of Federal Ad-
ministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. REV. 569, 572-92
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Ginnane].
1 See MEZINES, supra note 9, at 63-64.
2 See note 13 infra. Types of non-traditional legislative control include the legislative
veto, the "laying on the table" system, removal of certain members of an agency, and con-
gressional control of certain expenditures. See MEZINES, supra note 9, at 63-70. See generally
Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American Ex-
perience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031 (1955) (discussion of "laying on the table" system of
legislative control).
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resolution to supervise the agencies."3
The non-traditional nature of the legislative veto has led commen-
tators to question the constitutionality of the federal legislative veto.1'
The United States Constitution limits Congress to certain enumerated
legislative powers." Congress' powers do not include the right to ex-
ecute a law that it has already passed." The right to execute law is ex-
pressly reserved to the president. 7 By allowing a legislature to disap-
prove proposed rules by a concurrent resolution, the legislative veto
enables a legislature to execute its delegation of legislative authority to
the agencies. 8 Thus, the legislative veto may violate the separation of
powers doctrine, since the power to execute law is not within the con-
stitutional power of Congress.
Arguably, the federal legislative veto also conflicts with the
presidential veto power described in article 1, section 7 of the Constitu-
tion." Article 1, section 7 provides that the president shall have the op-
portunity to veto bills and every order, resolution, or vote for which the
concurrence of the two houses of Congress is necessary." Critics have
argued that the legislative veto's resolution process is an exercise of
legislative power requiring the concurrence of the houses of Congress."
Congress, therefore, should present the legislative veto's resolution to
the president for his approval. In apparent conflict with the presidential
veto power, however, the legislative veto does not require Congress to
submit the resolution for presidential scrutiny.' The Supreme Court to
11 See MEZINES, supra note 9, at 63-64. The resolution usually is simple (one-house) or
concurrent (majority of both houses). Id.
" See text accompanying notes 15-23 infra.
" U.S. CONST. art. I. Article I vests all legislative power in the Congress. Id. at § 1.
The remainder of the article describes the manner in which Congress may exercise the
legislative power, particularly section 7, which describes the procedure for passing bills and
resolutions. Id. at § 7.
" See Probable Response, supra note 5, at 287-88.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
" See Probable Response, supra note 5, at 287-88.
19 Id. But see Stewart, supra note 10, at 597-98; Cooper, supra note 10, at 501-14. In a
recent Ninth Circuit case, the Court of Appeals held a unicameral legislative veto un-
constitutional because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. Chadha v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 49 U.S.L.W. 2417, 2417 (9th Cir. 1980). The legislative veto in
question allowed one house of Congress to override by means of legislative resolution the
Attorney General's decision concerning the deportation of an alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)
(1970). The court held that the statute allowed Congress to interfere with the executive's
administration of the law and was therefore unconstitutional. 49 U.S.L.W. at 2418.
" See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593-94; Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False
Remedy For System Overload, 3 REG. - J. Gov. & Soc., Nov./Dec. 1979 at 20-21 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Scalia]; Stewart, supra note 10, at 597. But see Cooper, supra note 10,
at 479-514; Melville, supra note 1, at 48.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 & 3.
= See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593-95; Melville, supra note 1, at 48; Stewart, supra
note 10, at 609-15.
' See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 570 n.1. Ginnane has opined that the avoidance of ex-
ecutive scrutiny is the primary purpose of the legislative veto. Id. at 595.
LEGISLATIVE VETO
date has not decided the constitutionality of the federal legislative
veto.24
The arguments advanced against federal legislative veto provisions
also apply by analogy to state legislative vetoes.' All state constitutions
provide for separation for powers between the legislative and executive
branches of government. 8 Critics contend that by using the legislative
veto a legislature is acting outside its sphere of power in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.' Also, most state constitutions provide
that the governor has the right to veto any act of legislation passed by
the legislature.' If the legislative veto constitutes an act of legislation
and the legislature does not present the concurrent resolution to the
governor for his approval, the legislative veto conflicts with the guber-
natorial veto power.' In addition to the gubernatorial veto, state con-
stitutions require the legislature to comply with specific bill enactment
procedures to pass law." As an act of legislation, the legislative veto
may not meet the legislative enactment procedural requirements and
therefore may violate the respective state constitution.3 '
In State v. A.L.I. V.E. Voluntary 2 the Alaska Supreme Court recently
examined the constitutionality of Alaska's legislative veto provision.
24 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Supreme Court specifically
avoided the issue of the constitutionality of a legislative veto provision that allowed regula-
tions promulgated by the Federal Elections Commission to become effective within thirty
days of filing if neither house of Congress disapproved the provisions. Id. at 140 n.176.
Justice White, however, supported the constitutionality of the veto in a concurring opinion.
Id at 284-85. White argued that the power to disapprove proposed regulations did not con-
stitute legislation and therefore was not subject to the presidential veto power. Id.; see text
accompanying notes 46-80 infra.
One commentator has suggested that standing problems might prevent courts from
ruling on the issue of whether the legislative veto is constitutional. Ginnane, supra note 10,
at 609-11. The standing problem exists because the legislative veto does not give rise to an
"identifiable injury," but rather produces a distinct shift of power from one branch of the
government to another. See Watson, supra note 10, at 989. Watson also has suggested that
courts might be reluctant to deal with the problem of legislative veto constitutionality
because the legislative veto presents a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts. Id. at 989-90; see McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1134 (1977).
' See text accompanying notes 26-31 infra.
See 1 STATE CONSTITUTION -NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE SERIES 42, 65 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
27 See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS. supra note 26, at 61-62.
See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 26, at 60-61.
st See text accompanying note 30 supra.
606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980). A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary (A.L.I.V.E.) conducted fund-raising
lotteries under a permit issued by the Department of Revenue. Id. at 771. In 1977, the
department denied A.L.I.V.E. a permit on the grounds that A.L.I.V.E. had violated an
amended regulation limiting lottery prize money. A.L.I.V.E. brought suit against the state,
urging that the denial of the permit was wrongful. In response to the A.L.I.V.E. litigation,
the Alaska legislature annulled the regulation in question using a concurrent resolution
1981]
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The court determined that the pivotal issue in A.L.I. V.E. was whether
the legislative veto met the procedural requirements necessary for the
enactment of legislation." The legislative veto provision at issue in
A.L.I. V.E. provided: "The legislature, by a concurrent resolution
adopted by a vote of both houses, may annul a regulation of an agency or
department."' Article II of the Alaska Constitution sets forth the re-
quirements with which the legislature must comply before enacting
law. 5 Article II requires that the legislature confine bills to one
subject,"8 use a standard enactment clause, 7 give bills three readings,"
and make affirmative majority final votes on a bill. 9 Furthermore, arti-
cle II of the Alaska Constitution provides a gubernatorial veto allowing
the governor to review all bills."0 The court found that the legislative
veto in A.L.I. V.E. violated the legislative enactment requirements." The
legislative veto process did not require the legislature to present the
concurrent resolution of the legislative veto to the governor for his ex-
amination. Nor did the veto process require that the legislature give the
legislative veto a descriptive title or employ the standard enactment
clause. Since the legislative veto process did not conform to the man-
datory requirements for enacting law, the legislative veto was un-
constitutional .4
2
under an Alaska legislative veto statute. A.L.I.V.E. amended its complaint to assert that
the Department of Revenue could not deny a permit based upon a void regulation. The state
contended that the regulation actually had not been annulled because the legislature could
not annul an administrative action by concurrent resolution. The trial court granted partial
summary judgment, holding that the annulment was valid and rendered the regulation void
ab initio. The state then appealed the decision to the Alaska Supreme Court. Id.
Id. at 770; see text accompanying notes 35-42 infra.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320(a) (Michie 1976).
ALASKA CONST. art. II, §§ 13-14.
Id. at § 13.
3 J
Id. at § 14.
39 Id-
'0 Id. at §§ 15-17.
41 606 P.2d at 772.
42 Id. at 770. To support the holding of unconstitutionality, the A.L.I. V.E. court dis-
cussed three cases in which courts have addressed the issue of the constitutionality of
legislative veto statutes. Id. at 775-77. See generally Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028,
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Reith v. South Carolina State
Housing Authority (Ct. C.P., 11th Jud. Dist., Aug. 28, 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 267 S.C.
1, 225 S.E.2d 847 (1976); ad Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950).
In Atkins, the Court of Claims examined a federal legislative veto statute allowing
Congress to disapprove presidential recommendations for judicial salary increases. 556 F.2d
at 1034. In a four-three decision, the court declared the veto constitutional. Id. at 1070. The
Atkins court carefully limited its holding to the facts of the case, noting that judicial
salaries were peculiarly within the scope of legislative review. Id. at 1058-60. The A.L.I. V.E.
court found that the Atkins decision was limited to the facts of the case and did not con-
stitute strong authority for the proposition that generally the legislative veto is constitu-
tional. 606 P.2d at 776-77.
The A.L.I.V.E. court determined that both Opinion of the Justices and Reith sup-
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By focusing on the compliance with the procedural requirements, the
A.L.I. V.E. court assumed that the legislative veto procedure was an ex-
ercise of legislative power within the purview of the legislative enact-
ment provisions of the constitution. By making this assumption, the
A.L.L V.E. court failed to reach the underlying issue whether the
legislative veto was sufficiently legislative in character to invoke the ap-
plication of the article II requirements." A court's determination that
the legislative veto is an act of legislation is essential to, and must
necessarily precede, any application of the enactment requirements to
the legislative veto process." If the legislative veto is not an act of
legislation, the inquiry concerning article II requirements is moot. Of
course, a determination that a legislative veto does not constitute an act
of legislation raises the question whether a legislature exercising the
veto is acting within the scope of its constitutional powers. 5 The re-
mainder of this article will examine whether the legislative veto con-
stitutes an act of legislation.
One proponent of the legislative veto has distinguished the
legislative veto from acts of legislation by emphasizing that the
legislative veto is effectuated through a resolution process that lacks the
force of law. 6 The legislative veto derives its power from the statute
creating the veto which expressly allows the legislature to act by resolu-
ported the position that the legislative veto was unconstitutional. See 606 P.2d at 776. Reith
concerned an affirmative veto provision that required the South Carolina General Assembly
to approve a regulation by concurrent resolution before the regulation became effective. 267
S.C. at 4, 225 S.E.2d at 848. The Court of Common Pleas ruled that the provision was un-
constitutional because it violated legislative enactment provisions and the separation of
powers doctrine. Id., 225 S.E.2d at 848. In Opinion of the Justices, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court opined that a legislative veto authorized by a reorganizational statute
violated a constitutional provision requiring bi-cameral action to create legislation. 97 N.H.
at -, 83 A.2d at 741.
43 See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593. Ginnane, in particular, has recognized that a pro-
cess must be classified as legislative for constitutional provisions governing law-making to
apply. Id.
" See S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897). The Federal Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, in discussing the application of the executive veto to concurrent resolu-
tions, recognized that the preliminary inquiry was whether the concurrent resolution con-
stituted an act of legislation. Id.; see Ginnane, supra note 10, at 574.
" The Congress and state legislatures, with very few exceptions, can act only in a law-
making manner. See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593. The legislative veto, therefore, is either
an act of legislation which must comply with legislative procedural requirements, or a non-
legislative act outside the scope of the legislature. Id. at 593 n.108; see Chadha v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 49 U.S.L.W. at 2417-18; text accompanying note 19 supra.
Proponents of the legislative veto have urged that a legislature can act in a legislative
capacity that is at the same time not law-making. See Cooper, supra note 10, at 473-74. In
utilizing the legislative veto, the legislature is acting in a legislative capacity that is not law-
making. Id Since legislative procedural requirements only apply to law-making acts or acts
of legislation, proponents have argued that the legislative veto is not constitutionally in-
valid on procedural grounds. Id.
" See Cooper, supra note 10, at 474.
1981]
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tion.47 Thus, the resolution itself has no power.48 Arguably, the lack of in-
herent power on the part of the legislative veto distinguishes it from
acts of legislation.49 Advocates of the veto also differentiate between the
legislative veto and acts of legislation on the basis that the legislative
veto does not create new policy.' The legislative veto merely puts into
effect the policy embodied in the statute creating the veto. Since the
primary feature of a legislative act is that it creates policy, the
legislative veto does not constitute an act of legislation.2
Courts that have defined "acts of legislation" lend support to the no-
tion that generally the legislative veto does not constitute a legislative
act. In City of Newport v. Gugel,' the Kentucky Court of Appeals for-
mulated a test for determining whether a particular procedure is ad-
ministrative or legislative. Under the Gugel test, a legislative procedure
prescribes new policy, while an administrative procedure merely im-
plements policy. Since the legislative veto is arguably policy imple-
menting,5 the legislative veto would not constitute a legislative act
under the Gugel test.57
In Opinion of the Justices,5 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Court ap-
plied a strictly literal definition of "legislation" to the procedure in ques-
tion. The court defined legislation as the "enactment of laws in that
thoroughly settled sense," referring to the traditional bill-passing pro-
cedure. 9 Under this definition the legislative veto provision would not
'" Id. A resolution passed by Congress in the absence of a legislative veto statute





Id.; see text accompanying note 55 infra.
" See notes 54-59 infra.
342 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1960). Gugel concerned the validity of an ordinance regulating
the salaries of policemen and firemen. Id at 518. The court considered whether the or-
dinance which was passed by an initiative voting procedure applicable to acts of the city
council "legislative" in nature was the proper subject of the initiative procedure. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held that the act of regulating the salaries of public servants did not
describe a "new policy or plan," and therefore was administrative. Id at 520. The court held
that the ordinance was invalid because it was not the proper subject of the initiative voting
procedure. Id
Id. at 519.
See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
5 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921). In response to questions posed by the senate, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a state law was an invalid delegation of power to
Congress because the senate attempted to implement the eighteenth amendment of the
Federal Constitution through incorporation by reference of Congress' laws. Id. at __, 133
N.E. at 454. The court further stated that incorporation did not constitute "appropriate
legislation" required by the eighteenth amendment. Id
11 239 Mass. at .... 133 N.E. at 454.
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constitute an act of legislation because the veto utilizes a legislative
resolution rather than following the traditional bill-passing procedure.
An opponent of the legislative veto, Ginnane, has contended that the
legislative veto constitutes an act of legislation."0 Ginnane has argued
that legislatures have adopted the veto as a means of enacting law while
avoiding compliance with the constitutional requirements governing the
passage of legislation. 1 To support the conclusion that the legislative
veto constitutes an act of legislation, Ginnane concentrates on the prac-
tical effect of the legislative veto.2 Ginnane has argued that the legal
consequences of a legislative veto statute are indistinguishable from the
consequences of traditional legislation. 3 Ginnane has noted that
legislative vetoes produce results usually accomplished by formal bills,
such as executing statutes and disapproving governmental reorganiza-
tion plans. Since the veto produces the same effect on the law as the
formal bill-passing process, Ginnane has argued that the veto provisions
should meet the same constitutional procedural requirements as tradi-
tional legislation. 5
In Atkins v. United States,66 the Federal Court of Claims adopted an
"effect" analysis in deciding whether a legislative veto constituted a
legislative act. The Atkins court examined a veto allowing a single house
of Congress to annul a presidentially proposed payscale for judges. The
plaintiffs defined legislation as any act that repealed, modified, or
amended the law, and contended that the veto attempted to make law.
68
Under the plaintiffs' definition, the one-house veto was legislative in
nature and required affirmative bi-cameral action to be constitutionally
valid. 9 The court rejected the plaintiffs' characterization of the effect of
the veto and found that congressional exercise of the veto did not alter
the law."0 The court stressed that the result of the veto merely was to an-
nul an executive recommendation attempting to change existing law.7 1
By exercising the veto the legislature ensured that the law would re-
main unchanged. Thus, the Atkins court focused on the effect the veto
W See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593-94; text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
'" Ginanne, supra note 10, at 595. Ginnane indicated that Congress' primary purpose in
utilizing the legislative veto is to exclude the president from the law-making process and to
avoid constitutional procedural restrictions. Id.; see note 81 infra (purpose of Alaska pro-
cedural safeguards).
62 See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593.
I. at 593-94; Scalia, supra note 20, at 20.
4 See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593-94; note 10 supra.
M See Ginnane, supra note 10, at 593-94.
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. CL. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); see note 42 supra.




71 Id. The court noted that a similar result is reached when a single house of Congress
votes down a proposal for new legislation. Id.
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had on the existing law to determine whether the one-house veto was an
act of legislation. 2
State courts have also engaged in an "effect" analysis when deciding
whether a resolution procedure is an act of legislation.7 1 In Kelley v.
Secretary of State'7 the Michigan Supreme Court examined a concur-
rent resolution calling for an election and noted that the legislature's ex-
ercise of the resolution would produce the same effect on the law as if
the legislature had passed a bill or a joint resolution.7 5 Since the concur-
rent resolution had the effect of changing existing law, the resolution
had to meet the requirements of the state constitutional legislative
enactment provisions to be valid.78 In State v. Atterbury7 the Missouri
Supreme Court examined a concurrent resolution establishing an in-
vestigatory committee.7 8 The court looked to the substance and effect of
the resolution on the existing law to determine whether the resolution
constituted an act of legislation within the purview of the gubernatorial
veto provision of the Missouri Constitution.7 9 Finding that the resolution
effected no change in existing law, the court held that the resolution did
not have the effect of law, and therefore was outside the scope of the
gubernatorial veto.
Courts that apply the effect analysis properly balance the function of
the procedural safeguards against the need for legislatures to control
agency rule-making. The purpose of the legislative enactment provisions
is to confine the process through which a legislature may change the
law." The effect analysis subjects any process that changes the law to
72 Id
'3 See text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
149 Mich. 343, 112 N.W. 978 (1907). In Kelly, the Michigan Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a resolution calling for an election constituted a bill or a joint resolution
within the meaning of a constitutional provision requiring a concurrence of a majority of
both legislative houses for bills and joint resolutions to be valid. Id at -, 112 N.W. at 979.
The court held that the resolution had the same effect as a bill or joint resolution, the tradi-
tional law-making devices. Id. The resolution, therefore, required the concurrence of a ma-
jority of both houses to be valid. Id.
76 Id
76 Id
" 300 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1957). In Atterbury the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
legislature, by concurrent resolution, could authorize the formation of a joint investigatory
committee after the legislature had adjourned sine die, even though the governor had not
examined the resolution as required by article III, section 31 of the Missouri Constitution.
Id at 817. The court reached this result by finding initially that the joint resolution did not
have the force or the effect of law. Id.
73 Id.
9Id.
I Id The Atterbury court stressed that the effect was temporary and the resolution
did not establish a permanent rule of government. Id
" See 606 P.2d at 772. The one subject and descriptive title requirements of the
Alaska Constitution were designed to prevent fraud in the passage of laws. The use of a
specific enactment clause emphasizes that the legislature is speaking with the force of law.
The requirement that the bill be read three times insures legislative deliberation and allows
time for expression of public opinion. The executive veto prevents the passage of unwise
legislation and further serves as a check on the legislative branch of government. Id-
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the enactment requirements.2 If the legislative veto changes existing
law, it has the same effect on the law as a traditionally passed bill. A
legislative veto that changes law, therefore, should be subject to the
same legislative enactment requirements as a bill. Thus, the effect-
oriented reasoning prevents the type of legislative abuse where a
legislature uses the veto to enact legislation without complying with con-
stitutional restraints.83
The Alaska Supreme Court should have employed the Atkins effect
analysis to determine whether the Alaska legislative veto is subject to
the article II requirements of the Alaska Constitution. Had the court ap-
plied the Atkins analysis to the A.L.I. V.E. case, it would have found that
the legislative veto constituted an act of legislation.84 In A.L.I. V.E., the
Department of Revenue regulation had achieved the force of law.85 The
legislature then repealed the regulation by a concurrent resolution
resulting in a change in the substantive law." Applying the Atkins test,
the Alaska legislative veto constituted an act of legislation since the
veto had the same effect on the law as a properly enacted bill. Thus, the
Alaska Supreme Court was correct in applying the article II enactment
requirements to the veto and holding the legislative veto process
violative of the Alaska Constitution.
8 7
The conclusion that the legislative veto in A.L.I. V.E. constituted an
act of legislation is due to the absence of any temporal restraint upon the
Alaska legislative veto process.8 The Alaska statute allowed the
legislature to exercise the veto even after the regulation had become ef-
fective and achieved the force of law.88 Conversely, most state pro-
" See text accompanying note 62 supra.
83 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
See text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
See 606 P.2d at 771.
MId.
See text accompanying note 43 supra.
The Alaska statute is unique in its lack of temporal restraints Many state veto
statutes require some kind of legislative action before the rule becomes effective. For exam-
ple, Oklahoma requires that proposed rules be submitted to the legislature. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, § 308(b) (West 1978). If the legislature does not act on the rule within thirty
days, the rule is considered to be approved and achieves the force of law. Id at § 308(e).
Thus, the legislature must exercise the legislative veto within this time period or resort to
more traditional modes of legislation to effect control over administrative actions.
West Virginia, although it uses the legislative veto under a different set of cir-
cumstances, also confines the time period in which the legislature can exercise the veto. W.
VA. CODE § 29A-3-12 (Michie 1980). First, agencies submit proposed rules to a legislative
rulemaking review committee. Id. at 29A-3-11. The committee then approves or disapproves
the proposed rule. Id. Subsequently, the legislature reviews the committee's action and
either sustains or reverses the action by concurrent resolution. Id. at § 29A-3-12. The
legislature must exercise the legislative veto before the end of the legislative term or the
rule becomes effective. Id.
' See 606 P.2d at 775. The A.L.I. V.E. court stated that unlike the veto in Atkins, the
Alaska provision allowed disruption of ongoing executive programs. Id.; see text accompa-
nying notes 68-73 supra.
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cedures confine the legislature's exercise of the veto to the formative
stage of administrative rule-making." The statutes creating the
legislative veto require the legislature to scrutinize the proposed regula-
tion before it achieves the force of law." If the legislature vetoes a pro-
posed rule before it has the force of law, the legislature's exercise of the
veto does not alter the existing law, and therefore does not constitute an
act of legislation.9
In considering the question whether a legislative veto constitutes
legislation, courts should examine the veto process under the Atkins ef-
fect analysis. 3 Under the effect analysis courts should find that a state
legislative veto permitting the legislature to review administrative
rules before the rules obtain the force of law does not constitute legisla-
tion. 4 A temporally confined legislative veto, therefore, would not have
to meet state constitutional requirements controlling the enactment of
legislation to be valid.9 If a legislative veto does not constitute an act of
legislation, however, the veto may violate the doctrine of separation of
powers since the legislature might be "administrating," an executive
function. Thus, a court must further analyze the legislative veto under
the separation of powers doctrine to determine the constitutionality of
the veto.
JOHN KENT PEARSON
See note 82 supra.
" See note 88 supra.
See text accompanying note 71 supra.
See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra (discussion of Atkins).
' See text accompanying notes 90 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
